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MARJORIE ALLISEN,
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Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

Case No,

880031

:

AMERICAN LEGION POST NO. 134,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

(District Court
Case No. 38 319)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MARJORIE ALLISEN

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal was granted by Order of this Court on
March 1, 1988, pursuant to Rule 5 of the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Did

the

old

Utah

Dram

Shop

Act

apply

to

providers of beer as well as other alcoholic drinks?
B.

Would interpreting the old Utah Dram Shop Act

to not apply to providers of beer lead to absurd and incongruous results?
C.

Would interpreting the old Utah Dram Shop Act

to not apply to providers of beer be within the intent of
the Utah Legislature?
D.

Should the court recognize an action for negli-
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gence on the part of a provider of beer who negligently
serves beer to an already intoxicated person?
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The

statutes,

rules

or

cases

in

support

of

Respondent's position are as follows:
STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated Section 32-1-3
Utah Code Annotated Section 32-7-14
Utah Code Annotated Section 32-11-1
Utah Code Annotated Section 32A-14-1
STATEMENT OF CASE
Respondent was severely injured when she was struck
by an automobile operated by a Mr. Wesley Harju.

Mr. Harju

was a member of the American Legion Post in Clearfield,
Utah.

Prior to the accident, he consumed

at least six

glasses of beer at this American Legion Post.
weighs approximately 115 pounds.

Mr. Harju

The accident occurred when

Mr. Harju turned onto SR-126 in front of the Legion Post and
collided with the Respondent who was walking in the area at
the time.
Subsequently, the Respondent filed suit against the
American

Legion

Post

under

our

Utah

Dram

Shop

Act.

Appellant moved for summary judgment on the basis that Mr.
Harju

was

served

"light

beer"

prior

to

the

accident.

Appellant contended that light beer was not "liquor" within
the meaning of the Utah Dram Shop Act effective at the time
of the accident.

The trial court denied this motion.
-2-

(See

attached order of the court.)

Subsequently, the trial court

granted motions for summary judgment brought by Clearfield
City, Utah Power and Light Company and the State of Utah.
All of these parties were brought into this lawsuit as third
party defendants by Appellant American Legion Post 134.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Legislature intended for the 1981 Dram
Shop Act to apply to providers of beer as well as vodka,
whiskey, gin and other strong drinks.

This is because the

object of the Dram Shop Act was to force providers of alcoholic beverages to share a portion of the large cost to
society

that results

individuals.

from the misconduct of intoxicated

Since one can become drunk by drinking beer or

by drinking whiskey, the Dram Shop Act must sensibly apply
in both instances.
The discrepancy

in language

between

the Liquor

Regulatory Act and the Dram Shop Act can be accounted for by
the fact that the laws were enacted twelve years apart.
Also, it can be explained because the two acts have fundamentally
sales.

differing

purposes.

One

act

regulates

liquor

The other creates a private cause of action against

providers

of alcoholic beverages.

Definitions

from one

should not automatically be applied to the other.
The Utah Legislature has clarified the meaning of
the old Dram Shop Act by amending it to include providers of
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beer.

This should make it clear that it always was the

intent

of the legislature

within the statute.

to include providers

of beer

The fact that they were not included

was an oversight not a design.
Public policy considerations mandate that the old
Dram Shop Act be applied to providers of beer.
an absurd result will follow.

Otherwise,

In other words, a provider of

beer, certainly the largest quantity alcoholic beverage consumed in this state, will escape liability for causing an
intoxication while a provider of whiskey would not.

Laws

should not be interpreted to lead to absurd results.
Finally, the court should allow Respondent to maintain an action against the American Legion Post for common
law negligence if it holds that the old Dram Shop Act does
not apply here.

Such a result would be in harmony with Utah

statutory law and common sense,
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE:

THE UTAH DRAM SHOP ACT IN EFFECT AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT CONTAINED THE
PHRASE "LIQUOR" WHICH WAS MEANT TO
INCLUDE BEER.

Appellant's

contention

that this

lawsuit cannot

proceed because beer is not liquor as defined in the old
Utah Dram Shop Act is one which is without merit and must be
rejected.
The first argument which is made is that the "plain
meaning" of liquor simply does not encompass beer.
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This

point is not well taken.

It is common knowledge that liquor

is regulated because it has the propensity to make people
intoxicated.
judgment

Intoxicated individuals are more lacking in

than non-intoxicated

individuals.

Intoxication

causes individuals to act in a careless, negligent and reckless manner.

This can cause unnecessary, severe and even

fatal injuries to innocent third parties.

Drunk or intoxi-

cated motorists cause thousands of deaths every year on our
nation's highways.

They cause billions of dollars in direct

and indirect costs to society.

In an effort to see that a

small portion of the losses to innocent victims can be
compensated, the legislature enacted the Dram Shop Act.
Obviously, the legislature

intended

to penalize

establishments who serve intoxicated customers alcohol.

It

also intended to penalize establishments who served minors
alcohol when

these

establishments

cause

an

intoxication

which results in injury to a third person when damages are
assessed.

The whole idea of the Dram Shop Act was to force

manufacturers and retailers of intoxicating beverages to
share some of the exorbitant cost to society imposed by
drunks causing accidents.
Therefore, in light of the purpose of the Dram Shop
Act, the plain meaning of liquor must be held to include
beer.

This is because beer can cause an intoxication just

as bourbon, vodka, scotch, gin or rum can.

-5-

The legislative history of the Dram Shop Act makes
it equally clear that the legislature intended to allow Dram
Shop suits against beer retailers as well as those of other
alcoholic beverages.

In order to understand the true intent

of the legislature though, it is necessary to undertake an
analysis of all Utah liquor regulatory legislation.

Young

v. Barney, 433 P.2d 846 (Utah, 1966).
In 1969, the Utah Legislature adopted a comprehensive

regulatory

code

alcoholic

beverages.

operating

liquor

Contained

in

liquor.

this

for

selling

The

stores,
1969

code

and

set

private
law

is

serving

liquor

and

forth provisions

for

clubs
a

and

section

restaurants.
which

defines

Beer is excluded from this definition. [U.C.A. 32-1-3]
In 1981, in response to national trends, the Utah

Legislature passed the first Dram Shop Act.

This statute

stated that:
(1) Any person who gives, sells, or
otherwise provides intoxicating liquor to
another contrary to subsection 16-6-13.1
(8)(d), subsection 32-1-36.5 (1)(1), section 32-7-14 or subsection 32-7-24 (b) or
(c), and thereby causes the intoxication
of the other person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of
support to any third person, or the
spouse, child or parent of that third
person, resulting from the intoxication.
(2)
A person who suffers an injury
referred to in subsection (1) of this
section, shall have a cause of action
against the intoxicated person and the
person who provided
the intoxicating
liquor in violation of subsection (1)
above, or either of them.
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(3) If a person having rights or
bilities under this section dies,
rights or liabilities provided by
section! shall survive to or against
person s estate.

liathe
this
that

[U.C.A. 32-11-1, emphasis added.]
Appellant contends that the definition of liquor in
U.C.A. 32-1 through U.C.A. 32-7 enacted around 1969 must
control the definition of liquor in U.C.A. 32-22-1 which was
enacted in 1981.

Respondent submits that the definition

from this entirely different scheme of regulation must not
be automatically lifted from the code and applied to the
Dram Shop Act.

First, there is no legislative history which

would indicate it was the intent of the 1981 legislature to
apply the same definition of "liquor" which appeared in earlier legislation.

Second, there was a gap of twelve years

from the passage of the earlier legislation until the passage of the Dram Shop Act.
damentally

different

Third, the Dram Shop Act is fun-

legislation

measures enacted in 1969.

than

the

other

liquor

The 1969 legislation pertained

to licensing of liquor sales establishments and administrative regulation of such sales.

Dram Shop's legislation has

a fundamentally different character.

It creates a private

right to sue on the part of innocent third parties who are
injured by intoxicated individuals.

It does not enlarge or

change the power of the Utah Liquor Commission as was the
intent of the 1969 legislation.
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Therefore, the same set of

definitions

should

not

automatically

be

applied

to

both

statutes.
The subsequent legislative history of the Dram Shop
Act is even more crucial than the prior history.
the

Utah

Legislature

amended

the

include all "alcoholic beverages".

19 81 Dram

Shop

(1)
Any person who directly gives,
sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or
at a location allowing consumption on the
premises, any alcoholic beverage to a
person:
Who is under the age of 21

(b) Who is apparently under the
influence
of
intoxicating
alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs or,
'(c)
Whom the person furnishing
the alcoholic beverage knew or should
have known from the circumstances was
under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or,
(d)

Who is a known interdicted

person,
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of
support to any third person, or to the
spouse, child, or parent of that third
person, resulting from the intoxication.
An employer is liable for the actions of
its employees
in violation
of this
chapter.
(2)
A person who suffers an injury
under Subsection (1) has a cause of
action against the person who provided
the liquor or other alcoholic beverage in
violation of Subsection (1). [Emphasis
added]
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Act

(U.C.A. 32 A-14-1)

new statute states:

(a)
years or,

In 1986,
to

This

Appellant contends that the new Dram Shop Act was
enacted because the old act did not cover beer.
submits that this was not the case at all.

Respondent
Rather, the

statute was enacted to clarify an ambiguity in the old law.
In other words, the legislature changed the law so that everyone would clearly understand that the act was meant to
apply to beer as well as other intoxicating beverages.
law

was

changed

for

purposes

of

clarity

rather

The
than

substance.
In considering the meaning that the Utah Legislature
intended the old Dram Shop Act to have it is important to
understand

a principle of statutory

construction.

This

principle is that reason and intention may prevail over
technically applied literalness.

Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d

972 (Utah, 1965).
Public policy considerations are extremely important in this case.

If the court accepts Appellant's inter-

pretation of the 1981 Dram Shop Act it will lead to an
absurd result.

Bars which serve beer are immune from a Dram

Shop suit while private clubs which serve bourbon, vodka or
gin will not be immune.

The court will fail to have focused

on the most important thing:
intoxicated.

the fact that someone was made

The court should consider the principle of

statutory construction which says that statutes should not
be construed to lead to unintended and incongruous results.
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Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d

915

Harman Eletronics, 575 P.2d

(Utah, 1964).

1044

Curtis v.

(Utah, 1978) [Statutes

are presumed not to be intended to produce absurd consequences and will be construed so that they do not]. Barton
v. Carson, 380 P.2d 926 (Utah, 1963) [Statutes should be
accorded reasonable and logical meanings],
POINT TWO:

EVEN IF THE COURT HOLDS THAT THE OLD
DRAM
SHOP LAW DOES NOT PERMIT AN
ACTION FOR INTOXICATION CAUSED BY
BEER, IT MUST ALLOW THIS ACTION TO
PROCEED ON A COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE
THEORY.

Even if this court should hold that the old Dram
Shop Act does not apply to beer, then Respondent's case
cannot be dismissed.

Rather, Respondent should be allowed

to maintain this lawsuit against American Legion Post 134 on
the basis of a common law negligence theory.
The record in this case established that Mr. Wesley •
Harju consumed six beers at the American Legion Post prior
to the accident.
statute

in

effect

At the time of the accident, Utah had a
which made

it unlawful

intoxicated individual alcoholic beverages.

to

serve an

U.C.A. 32-7-14

stated that:
No person shall sell or supply any
alcoholic beverages or permit alcoholic
beverages to be sold or supplied to any
person under or apparently under the
influence of liquor.
The central idea of negligence law is that if one
violates a duty and as a proximate result of that violation
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injures another, he is liable for damages.
created by statute or by common law.

Duties can be

Respondent contends

that U.C.A. 32-7-14 creates a duty to not serve intoxicated
persons alcoholic beverages. Any breach of this duty should
be considered negligence.

If injuries proximately result

from this negligence, a jury should be allowed to award the
injured party damages.
Even if the court believes this statute creates no
duty, this court should recognize a duty through a common
law analysis.

In United States v. Carroll Towing Company,

159 F.2d 169 (CA2, 1947) the court states the now classic
formula

for determining

negligence.

Judge

whether

Learned

Hand

an activity
indicated

constituted
that

a duty

exists depending upon (1) the probability of injury, (2) the
gravity of the potential injury, and (3) the burden of taking precautions.

In the case at bar, the probability that

an intoxicated patron of the Legion could harm someone was
considerable.

The gravity of a potential injury was high

(particularly

if

we

include

motor

vehicle

accidents).

Finally, the burden of taking precautions was not high. Bartenders need simply to be instructed to not serve more than
two or three beers to each customer as a maximum.
Under any analysis the court must recognize a legal
duty on the part of the American Legion Post to not serve
beer to intoxicated patrons.

The breach of this duty must

-11-

be held to actionable as negligence.
CONCLUSION
The idea that one who serves an intoxicated patron
beer instead of whiskey should be immune from lawsuit under
the Dram Shop Act is absurd.
such a result.

The legislature did not intend

Rather, the discrepancy in statutory lan-

guage exists because:
1.

There was a twelve year gap between the passage

of the Liquor Regulatory Act and the first Dram Shop Act;
2.

The Dram Shop Act has a fundamentally different

nature than the Liquor Regulatory Act.

Therefore, the leg-

islature did not intend definitions from the regulatory law
to be lifted and automatically applied to the Dram Shop Act.
It must also be noted that the legislature has
acted and now changed the language "liquor" to "alcoholic
beverages".

This should be interpreted as clarifying the

meaning

the

of

earlier

law

rather

than

changing

it.

Clearly, the old Dram Shop Act was intended to cover servers
of beer as well as whiskey, vodka and other strong drinks.
Even if the court interprets the old Dram Shop Act
to exclude servers of light beer, Respondent must be permitted to proceed with this case*
theory of negligence.

Respondent can proceed on a

Such a theory can be based on U.C.A.

32-7-14 or upon the common sense idea that it is dangerous

-12-

to serve alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated individual.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Pcrx

day of June, 1988.

JAMES R. HASENYAGER .',
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARJORIE ALLISEN,
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
AMERICAN LEGION POST NO.
135,

Civil No.

38319

Honorable Douglas Cornaby
Defendant.

AMERICAN LEGION POST NO.
134,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

Clearfield City's Motion for Summary Judgment in it's
favor and against third-party plaintiff American Legion Post

No. 134 came on regularly for a hearing on October 27, 1987.
The State of Utah Department of Transportation and Utah Power &
Light Company joined in Clearfield City's Motion.

The Court

reviewed the Motion and the Memoranda on file, and the Court
fully heard the argument of counsel.

The Court being fully

advised in the premises, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that
the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Clearfield City,
the State of Utah Department of Transportation, and Utah Power
& Light Company and against American Legion Post No. 134 be, and
hereby is granted.
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that:

Judgment be, and hereby is entered in favor

of Clearfield City, the State of Utah Department of Transportation,
and Utah Power & Light Company and against American Legion Post
No. 134, no cause of action.
DATED this

day of

, 1987.
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